Bundling is a political science concept involving selection of candidates for public office, and is often studied in public choice theory. Occurring principally in republics, the electorate, rather than directly voting on each individual piece of proposed legislation, must choose a number of candidates (or parties) for the legislature. In so doing, they accept or reject each individual candidate or party and their "bundle" of positions on various issues. As there may be no candidate who perfectly reflects the views an individual voter on all the issues of importance to him/her, each voter must prioritize what issues are most important and choose a candidate accordingly. Another form of bundling occurs in races where the candidate has a running mate who is elected on the same ticket, as in U.S. presidential elections.
Bundling, as studied in public choice theory is essentially a variant of product bundling: each candidate and party is marketed as a product comprising a bundle of positions and attributes. In party-list proportional representation (particularly closed list variants), bundling may be especially pronounced, as voters select an entire slate of party candidates rather than choosing individual candidates, thus lacking the option of selecting one candidate of a party and not another. Robert Cooter's The Strategic Constitution notes that when voters' demand for a party is inelastic, the party will tend to nominate candidates based more on loyalty than on popularity: "Thus, monopoly power of a party decreases the demand of its leaders for loyalty."[1]
Bundling in political economy is not to be confused with bundling of donations in campaign finance. It has been argued that bundling can often reduce the cost of political transactions.[2] But it has also been argued that the bundling of policy packages necessitated by indivisibility weakens the signals provided even by well-informed voters.[3]
In the corporate world, this problem is dealt with through proxy voting, in which each shareholder can appoint a specific individual to represent him (this appointment being unaffected by who anyone selects as their proxy). Theoretically, a direct democracy would eliminate this problem, as there would be no need to accept a candidate and their bundle of positions. Nonetheless, members of a coalition might find the need to make compromises with other members in order to maintain their cohesive group and stay in power. In countries that use proportional representation, a single transferable vote can also allow voters to debundle candidates from their parties.
In a voluntary community, market forces provide an alternate set of safeguards, as different communities compete to provide bundles of services at quality levels and prices that consumers will buy. Such forces already influence property values in communities that have governments, but there is typically a disconnect between governmental authorities' incentives (such as salary) and the property values and other economic indicators of a community's attractiveness to buyers.